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Abstract
This paper examines the in￿ationary consequences of a currency
changeover in the catering market. Empirical evidence from the Michelin
Red Guide shows that: i) di￿erently from restaurants in non-euro countries,
restaurants in the euro area experienced abnormal price increases just after
the changeover, ii) among restaurants in the euro area, tourist restaurants
are responsible for most of the abnormal price increases. These results
suggest that proposed explanations for the changeover e￿ect such as menu
adjustment and rounding up are only part of the story. We present a simple
model of the catering market that is consistent with the evidence.
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1I Introduction
The introduction of the Euro notes and coins on 1st January 2002 to replace
national currencies has sparked o￿ an intense debate on the economic consequences
of the changeover. According to a conventional view, the change of currency
should not have any e￿ects on relative prices, since money is simply a ‘veil’. The
main direct consequences of the changeover should be a reduction in transaction
costs, an increase in allocative e￿ciency due to a reduction in price uncertainty,
a boost to competition due to greater price transparency.
On the other hand, a much feared cost in the public opinion, often reported
by the media, was the possibility of generalized price in￿ation triggered by the
currency changeover. Price increases in restaurants and in the service sector
have indeed taken place following the introduction of the Euro. These increases
have initially been attributed to the dynamics of costs in the food sector due to
inclement weather conditions (European Central Bank, March 2002, April 2002).
It has been argued that ‘the extent of the cash changeover e￿ect has been relatively
limited, and should be temporary’ (European Central Bank, July 2002).
Although price increases might have been una tantum with no long-run e￿ect
on the in￿ation rate, the change in relative prices may well have been permanent.
This paper provides support for the layman’s view that the changeover resulted
in a permanent change in relative prices.
What triggered the price increases that followed the changeover? Several possi-
ble explanations have been suggested: (i) pre-existing in￿ation trends, (ii) increase
in food costs due to bad weather, (iii) delayed and overdue adjustments of menus
(Hobijin et al., 2006), and (iv) rounding-up of prices in the new currency. To
these, we add a further explanation (v): the switch from national currencies to
2the Euro may have acted as a device that led ￿rms to co-ordinate their expecta-
tions on pricing behaviour. The exogenous change in cash denomination has thus
shifted the industry to a higher-price equilibrium. In other words, the widespread
concerns about possible generalized price increases associated with the introduc-
tion of the new currency have generated self-ful￿lling in￿ationary expectations.
In this respect, the introduction of the single currency provides an interesting nat-
ural experiment. Laboratory evidence suggests that, in the presence of multiple
equilibria, the nominal denomination of individuals’ payo￿s may determine which
equilibrium is selected. Fehr and Tyran(2001) ￿nd that subjects react di￿erently
to monetary shocks depending on whether they receive payo￿ information in real
or nominal terms. Also, Fehr and Tyran (2007) show that agents may coordinate
on di￿erent equilibria when they face nominal payo￿s rather than real payo￿s.
It is therefore interesting to assess whether the e￿ects observed at lab level are
consistent with the evidence from a natural experiment. 1
We develop a simple model where customers have heterogeneous information
sets. There are informed agents (locals) who know the quality of individual restau-
rants and uninformed agents (tourists) who do not. Restaurants choose whether
to specialize in dealing only with a single type of customers or to attract both
types. Low quality restaurants and restaurants located in tourist areas are more
tempted to set a price that leaves negative surplus to their customers, exploiting
the imperfect information of tourists. This is traded o￿ by the cost of losing po-
tential local customers. The model predicts that, in the presence of an upward
shift of the equilibrium price, restaurants which have a comparative advantage in
1Other works make use of the natural experiment produced by the changeover to the euro.
Cannon and Cipriani (2006) compare church collections before and after the Euro in Italy and
Republic of Ireland. They ￿nd evidence of an increase of church giving for both countries.
Another paper on donations in churches around the Euro-introduction is Soetevent (2005).
3attracting tourists will experience larger price increases.
The empirical part of the paper discriminates among the possible explanations
by using data on individual restaurants obtained from the Michelin Red Guide.
The Guide, which has the merit to provide information about restaurants accord-
ing to consistent and rigorous criteria, is a rich collection of valuable data that
have hitherto not been utilized for exploring the determinants of price changes
over time. By looking at restaurants both inside and outside the Euro area, we
can test the hypothesis that the price increases were speci￿c to countries which
experienced the changeover. By combining pre-changeover and post-changeover
data, we are able to assess whether the changeover resulted in abnormal increases
in prices. Finally, by exploiting the heterogeneity in the determinants of restau-
rants’ equilibrium strategies we are able to discriminate between our model and
all the competing explanations. The prediction that price increases will mainly
occur in tourist locations enables us to reject explanations based on production
factors, menu costs, and rounding up, that would instead apply independently of
the ability to attract tourists.
It is worth noting that restaurants included by the guide are selected on the ba-
sis of the price-quality combination o￿ered to their customers. This suggests that
our results might underestimate the real impact of the changeover. Nevertheless,
the evidence indicates that the changeover did trigger abnormal price increases
in the euro area. As predicted by the model, tourist restaurants appear to be re-
sponsible for most of the abnormal in￿ation. This supports the expectation-driven
view of price in￿ation following the changeover, against all competing alternatives.
Hence, a permanent change in relative prices has occurred with the introduction
of the Euro, with clear redistributional consequences.
4The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II sets up the stage for the discus-
sion and outlines the main rationales for the price increases. Section III describes
the data. Section IV presents the speci￿cation and describes the empirical results.
Section V address various issues of robustness. Section VI outlines the theoretical
model, which is fully derived in the Appendix. Section VII concludes.
II Currency changeovers and restaurant prices
The possible explanations for higher restaurant in￿ation in the euro area can be
grouped into explanations that are independent of the changeover and explana-
tions that identify the changeover as the main source of price increases. Among
the ￿rst group are:
i Pre-existing trends of in￿ation, according to which, cross-country di￿erences in
post-changeover in￿ation levels are the results of di￿erent in￿ation trends
in the pre-changeover period.
ii Production factors, whereby the increase in restaurant prices is merely the re-
sult of an increase in the price of productions factors. In particular, bad
weather during the changeover period might have damaged crops and in-
creased the cost of ingredients.
Among the explanations that identify the changeover as the source of restau-
rant in￿ation are:
iii Rounding up. With the arrival of the new currency, old currency prices of all
goods had to be rounded up to the nearest cent of euro. This story suggests
that the rounding up might have been exploited by the sellers to increase
prices.
5iv Menu adjustment. Knowing that menus had to be reprinted with the intro-
duction of notes denominated in the new currency, restaurants delayed the
update of their menus in the months preceding the changeover. According
to this story, the simultaneous menu adjustment caused the price increases.
In addition to these explanations, we consider the possibility that the changeover
e￿ect may have been the result of an expectation driven shift in the equilibrium
price of restaurants within the euro area. In section VI, we outline a simple model
of the catering market based on imperfect information and market segmentation.
The main appeal of the model is that it provides predictions which are alternative
to the explanations hitherto described. We assume that restaurants attract two
types of customers endowed with di￿erent information sets: regular customers
who know the quality of a restaurant in advance (\locals") and all other cus-
tomers (\tourists"). Restaurants di￿er both in the quality of their meals and in
the probability to be visited by tourists. Establishments situated in more strategic
locations are likely to attract more tourists than local customers. 2
Our focus is on how restaurants’ choice of whether to rip o￿ or to be \honest"
depends on the likelihood to be matched with uninformed consumers and on
market prices. Strategic interaction between restaurants and customers may lead
to a continuum of equilibrium price levels. The changeover can trigger a revision
in expectations and, consequently, a change in the equilibrium prices. This could
happen if, for instance, restaurants expect customers to commit mistakes when
handling the new currency.3 In this case, the e￿ect of the changeover would
2Models with informed and uninformed consumers have been widely considered in the litera-
ture. An extensive survey of the literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Among the seminal
contributions are Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), and Cooper and
Ross (1984).
3An informal discussion of how the changeover can alter the equilibrium is contained in
section VI.
6be asymmetric across locations. Prices of restaurants in tourist locations would
permanently increase whereas prices of restaurants in non-tourist locations would
only temporarily be a￿ected and would revert back to their normal levels. This
result applies to restaurants in \extreme" locations, i.e. restaurants which have a
clear comparative advantage in attracting either tourists or locals. The impact of
the changeover on restaurants which are potentially attractive both for tourists
and for locals is non-homogenous. Restaurants in this group might increase, keep
unchanged, or even lower their prices.
As a result of the change in the equilibrium price, tourists generally face price
increases. Locals could also face price increases when matched with restaurants
catering for both types of customers. This helps to explain the casual evidence
that many complaints about price increases actually came from locals. If faced
with higher prices, locals have more readily available evidence, such as memory
of past bills, to back their complaints. Thus, it is not surprising that locals were
the ￿rst to start the fuss.
The fact that locals may face price increases is also consistent with the euro-
related increase in perceived in￿ation documented, for instance, by Dziuda and
Mastrobuoni (2006).
A natural way to discriminate among the various alternatives is to consider the
dynamics of the in￿ation di￿erential, i.e. the di￿erence in price change between
restaurants in the euro area and restaurants outside the euro area which have not
experienced the changeover. The comparison of the in￿ation di￿erential before
and after the changeover permits to assess the hypothesis that the \changeover
e￿ect" be just the result of di￿erent trends of in￿ation between euro countries and
other EU countries. An increase of the in￿ation di￿erential after the changeover
7would in fact reject this hypothesis. It would also cast doubts on the hypothesis
that the price increases were due to an increase in the cost of production factors
(e.g. ingredients), since this would likely a￿ect euro and non euro countries alike.
On the other hand, it is still possible that European regions had been a￿ected by
adverse whether conditions in an asymmetric fashion and that, due to transporta-
tion costs and other barriers to trade, the increase in the price of food had been
heterogenous across Europe. Moreover, a mere analysis of the in￿ation di￿erential
over time would be of no help in discriminating between the rounding up hypothe-
sis, the menu adjustment hypothesis, and the hypothesis of an expectation driven
change in the equilibrium price. All these stories are compatible with an increase
of the in￿ation di￿erential during the changeover.
In order to identify the most likely explanation, the changeover e￿ect must be
conditioned on restaurants’ individual characteristics. To this aim, we consider
whether the e￿ect of the euro varies with the potential for attracting tourists. We
refer to this potential as \location". The hypotheses of menu costs, of rounding
up, and of an increase in the cost of ingredients do not predict that the changeover
should be conditional on location. A priori, their impact should be homogenous
across tourist and non-tourist locations. By converse, the hypothesis of an ex-
pectation driven shift in the equilibrium put forward by the model suggests that
restaurants in tourist locations increased their prices more than restaurants facing
a clientele of locals.
III Data description
We collected data from the Michelin Red Guide (\Main Cities of Europe") for
six countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and UK. All the six
8countries are long-standing members of the European Union. France, Germany,
and Italy have adopted the Euro as a new national currency since 2002. 4 Denmark,
Sweden, and UK retained their national currencies. We consider restaurants for
which observations are available for all four editions. Despite euro notes having
been introduced since January 2002, the 2002-2003 period is the most appropriate
to capture the e￿ect of the changeover on prices for two reasons. First, the guide is
published by the end of March each year and some countries experienced a double
currency regime for the ￿rst months of 2002. Second, during 2002 some local
authorities kept prices under strict monitoring in order to avoid unfair rounding
up. For these reasons the impact of the changeover on the 2001-2002 period should
be very limited. The analysis mainly focuses on the comparison between the post-
changeover period 2002-2003 and pre-changeover period 2000-2001. However, for
completeness, the estimates of the in￿ation di￿erential for the 2001-2002 period
are also presented.
The information about restaurants’ ability to attract tourists is summarized
by the following dummy variables: i) TL (tourist location), which takes value 1 if
the restaurant is classi￿ed as a restaurant in a tourist location and zero otherwise;
ii) PL (popular location), which takes value 1 if the restaurant is in a location
with no clear bias toward tourists or locals; iii) LL (local customers location),
which is 1 if the restaurant is classi￿ed as a restaurant in a non-tourist location.
In order to classify restaurants, we use the description in the guide. Restau-
rants classi￿ed as TL must satisfy at least one of the following conditions: a)
4The events leading to the introduction of the euro can be summarized as follows. In De-
cember 1998 ￿xed exchange rates between euro and national currencies were announced by the
national central banks of the twelve countries joining the euro. Starting from January 1999,
the euro became the o￿cial currency in these countries, although no notes were issued in euros.
Since January 2002 notes in national currency started to be replaced by notes in euros. The
replacement process was completed on di￿erent dates across the twelve countries.
9restaurants for which the description explicitly states that their customers are
mainly tourists, b) restaurants located in particular tourist areas, 5 c) restaurants
with a particular view, d) hotel restaurants. Restaurants classi￿ed as LL are:
e) restaurants for which the description explicitly states that their customers are
mainly regulars, f) restaurants for which the description uses expressions like
\out of tourist routes" or \neighborhood restaurant" or another equivalent ex-
pression,6 g) restaurants with some rare specialty. Restaurants which either fall
in both previous classes, or fall in neither of the previous classes, are classi￿ed as
PL, a residual category. The motivation for conditions a), b), d), e), and f) is
obvious. Why restaurants with a particular view (condition c) should be TL and
restaurants with a rare specialty (condition g) should be LL is more debatable.
The ￿rst criterion is consistent with the fact that panoramic areas tend to be
frequented by tourists. As for the second, if a restaurant’s main attraction is a
special dish, then its business model probably relies on the presence of a well-
informed clientele. Customers with ex-ante information on the type of cuisine
that the restaurant o￿ers are thus more likely to go to the restaurant.
Since the guide uses a variety of expressions to describe a restaurant, whether
the restaurant meets one or more of the criteria we have set is decided by a research
assistant who interprets the guide’s description. In section V we: a) show that our
results emerge even when considering a more conservative and objective criterion
to classify restaurants, b) analyze the sensitiveness of the results to alternative
speci￿cation of the location variables. In particular, our results do not rely on
conditions c) and g).
5Whether the restaurant is in a tourist area is usually mentioned in the guide’s description.
Some examples: \A charming rustic atmosphere pervades this Montmartre inn...", \This historic
restaurant near the Rialto...", \...was at the vanguard of Soho’s culinary renaissance" (our italic).
6Some examples: \Indian restaurant in a residential street...", \Local restaurant in business
district", \In an unfashionable part of town...".
10The procedure used to build LL, TL and PL can reasonably be assumed as
exogenous in our short-term analysis. It relies on the exogenous capacity to attract
tourists rather than on restaurants’ short-term pricing strategies.
The guide has a measure of the perceived quality of cuisine, given by the
number of stars (which takes increasing values 0,1,2,3, according to the quality).
Finally, the indication of whether booking is essential can be used as a proxy of
the restaurant’s capacity constraints.
Relative frequencies of restaurants’ characteristics are reported in table 1. The
table suggests that the euro and non-euro subsamples are very similar in terms
of mix of locations and capacity constraints (BOOKING ESS.). The frequency
of stars reported in the table is relative to the 2000 edition. Euro countries seem
to slightly outperform non-euro countries in terms of stars awarded by the guide.
UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE are binary variables which indicate whether the
number of stars has respectively increased or decreased in the period considered.
As the table suggests, upgrades and downgrades are relatively rare events.
As for prices, the measure of in￿ation is the logarithmic price change from
the previous year. The guide reports a minimum and a maximum price for each
restaurant. The minimum is meant to represent the price of a simple meal while
the maximum is the price of an elaborate three-course meal. We present the
empirical results for both prices. It is worth noting that the main results of the
analysis are unchanged by the use of a midpoint price. 7 The top part of table
2 reports descriptive statistics for the log change in minimum prices. Standard
deviations are too high to reach any conclusion. However, it is interesting to notice
that the largest gap in median in￿ation between euro and non euro restaurants
is experienced by restaurants in tourist locations in the post-changeover periods
7Results for the midpoint price are available upon requests.
11(+5.8%). Results for the maximum price go in the same direction. The largest
gap between euro and non euro is experienced by restaurants in tourist locations
in the pre-changeover period (-4.2%). The sign of the di￿erence is reversed in the
post-changeover period 2002-2003 (+3.3%).
These e￿ects can be better grasped by looking at ￿gures 1 and 2. For all
types of locations (TL, LL, PL) they show the di￿erence in cumulative distri-
bution functions between euro and non euro restaurants. Figure 1 refers to the
cumulative distributions for the log change in minimum price, while ￿gure 2 per-
forms the same analysis for the maximum price. The solid line represents the
di￿erence in the pre-changeover period 2000-2001. The dashed line is the di￿er-
ence in the post-changeover period 2002-2003. Negative values of the function
imply that the cumulative distribution for euro restaurants lies to the right of the
cumulative distribution for non-euro restaurants. The graphs are broadly con-
sistent with a general shift to the right of the distribution for euro restaurants
after the changeover, especially for the maximum price. However, for restaurants
in tourist locations, the shift to the right is much more pronounced (both for
maximum and minimum price). Figure 3 corroborates this intuition by looking at
post-changeover di￿erences between euro and non-euro in excess of pre-changeover
di￿erences (di￿erence in di￿erence). Relative to the pre-changeover situation, the
euro{non-euro gap for TL (dashed line) has increased much more than the euro{
non-euro gap for LL (solid line). This suggests that the e￿ect of the changeover
may interact with the location of the restaurant.
Finally, the sample contains several potential outliers. For instance, in the
￿rst period (2000-2001) the top 1% of restaurants with highest change of the
minimum price have experienced an increase of more than 69%. The other years
12display similar extreme increases and reductions, although slightly less marked.
A symptom of the e￿ect of outliers is that, as will be discussed, robust estimates
tend to di￿er from OLS estimates.
IV Results
The baseline model comprises twenty control variables. The ￿rst eighteen capture
all the interactions between restaurants’ locations (TL, LL, PL), period dummies
(2000-01,2001-02, 2002-03), and a dummy for the euro area. The remaining control
variables account for changes in price that are not related to the changeover such as
a downgrade or an upgrade in the assessment of the restaurant’s quality. Omitting
the subscript for individual restaurants, the baseline model is:
￿P
j = ￿ekt + ￿Zt + ￿ekt (1)
where j = min;max; e = euro;non ￿ euro; k = TL;PL;LL and t = 1;2;3,
where 1, 2, and 3 denote periods 2000-01, 2001-02, and 2002-03 respectively.
Zt is a vector of control variables that should not interact with the changeover.
Speci￿cally, Zt comprises a dummy variable (UPGRADE) taking value 1 if the
restaurant received an upgrade by the guide in the previous year, and a dummy
variable (DOWNGRADE) taking value 1 if the restaurant received a downgrade.
In the actual estimates, we slightly modify (1) to allow for a constant term. This is
obtained by replacing the ￿rst period dummy for PL restaurants with a constant.
Since our sample contains a lower number of restaurants outside the euro area,
we use a dummy taking value 1 if the restaurant is outside.
From (1), the e￿ect of the euro on in￿ation is captured by the di￿erence in
di￿erence terms. These are given by:
￿euro;k;3 ￿ ￿euro;k;1 ￿ (￿non￿euro;k;3 ￿ ￿non￿euro;k;1) (2)
13for k = TL;LL;PL.
As already mentioned, the data may present a number of outliers. For this
reason we estimated the model using a robust regression approach. 8 Alterna-
tive estimation methods are presented and discussed in section V. There, we
also address potential problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. We be-
lieve that a robust regression approach is appropriate to the problem we consider.
When outliers are not taken into account, OLS coe￿cients tend to be quite di￿er-
ent depending on whether the minimum or maximum price is used. By contrast,
coe￿cients obtained from robust regression do not su￿er from this problem. Coef-
￿cients obtained with OLS also tend to be di￿erent from robust coe￿cients. This
is generally viewed as a symptom of the presence of outliers. We interpret these
results as evidence that OLS coe￿cients are not fully reliable.
Results for the baseline model are presented in table 3. The ￿rst eighteen con-
trol variables are the interactions between time periods, locations, and currency
areas. The coe￿cients that should capture the di￿erences between non-euro and
euro restaurants, in the bottom half of the table, are usually either zero or nega-
tive. This suggests that in￿ation is generally higher for euro restaurants. As for
the other control variables, only UPGRADE is signi￿cant and with the expected
sign and only when the minimum price is used as dependent variable. The low
frequency of upgrades and downgrades is a likely explanation for this result.
In order to assess the e￿ect of the changeover, it is necessary to compare post-
changeover di￿erences in in￿ation with pre-changeover di￿erences. This is done
in table 4 where the di￿erence in di￿erence terms are computed. The ￿rst row
8This is implemented by using the command rreg in STATA. It works as follows. First, Cook’s
D is computed and zero weight is given to each observation for which D > 1. Weights assigned
to the other observations are based on absolute regression residuals. The procedure is iterated
so that each time the regression is estimated, weights are computed, and a new regression is
estimated using the new weights. Both Huber weights and biweights are used.
14of table 4 shows, for each type of location, di￿erences between euro and non-euro
restaurants for the pre-changeover period 2000-01. These are generally small and
homogeneous across locations. The second row shows the di￿erences after the
changeover. Here the di￿erences appear more marked in tourist locations . The
di￿erence between the second and the ￿rst row (third row) measures the impact
of the changeover. The table shows that most of the changeover e￿ect has been
concentrated in tourist restaurants. For these, the estimated e￿ect is an abnormal
price increase of about 8% when the maximum price is used and about 6% when
the minimum price is used. These numbers are both economically and statistically
signi￿cant (1% and 5% con￿dence levels respectively). For the other types, the
e￿ect is remarkably smaller and never signi￿cant.
The bottom part of table 4 presents the results obtained with a model in which
restaurants’ types of locations have been omitted. In other words, coe￿cients
for all locations were constrained to be the same. The results show that the
impact of the changeover is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero when the minimum
price is used and is about 4.7 % when the maximum price is used. Although
the e￿ect for the maximum price is signi￿cantly positive, an abnormal increase
of 4.7% is substantially di￿erent, from an economic perspective, from the 8%
increase estimated for tourist restaurants. The comparison of the two models in
table 4 thus suggests that, by omitting restaurants’ characteristics, one might be
tempted to belittle the economic relevance of the changeover for some categories
of consumers and restaurants.
Since speci￿cation (1) involves a fairly large number of control variables rela-
tive to the sample size, we also consider an alternative, more parsimonious speci-
￿cation. The main rationale for controlling for restaurants’ characteristics is that
15the e￿ect of the changeover is heterogenous. Therefore, a natural restriction is to
assume that, in a given period, restaurants outside the euro area experienced the
same level of in￿ation independently of their location. After all, they should not
be a￿ected by the changeover. Formally, this restriction is equivalent to assuming:
￿non￿euro;TL;t = ￿non￿euro;PL;t = ￿non￿euro;LL;t ￿ ￿non￿euro;t (3)
where ￿non￿euro;t varies through time but is constant across locations. Before
estimating the restricted model, restriction (3) is tested by computing an F-test
for the joint hypotheses. As will be discussed, the main results obtained with this
speci￿cation are quite similar for both maximum and minimum price. However,
the restriction largely passes the test when the maximum price is the dependent
variable, but is not accepted when the minimum is used instead. Thus, results for
the minimum price should be taken with caution.
Results are presented in table 5. The main di￿erence between the models
estimated with the maximum and with the minimum price lies in the results for
the interim period 2001-02. When the maximum price is used, both restaurants
classi￿ed as TL and as LL show positive coe￿cients already in the interim period.
In principle, an increase in the di￿erential for di￿erent types of restaurants in
the interim period is compatible with a menu cost story. It is also worth noting
that the guide is published at the beginning of the year and a double currency
regime was in place at the beginning of 2002. This probably had the e￿ect of
limiting the price increases of euro restaurants. However, in the period 2002-03,
when the double currency regime was lifted, tourist restaurants experience an
unprecedented upsurge in the value of the coe￿cient. The fact that this is not
matched by equivalent increases for other types of restaurants indicates that menu
costs are only part of the story. As the table shows, this result is independent of
16whether the maximum or the minimum price is used. The di￿erence in di￿erence
terms are presented in the top part of table 6. Although the changeover e￿ect
seems to be slightly larger when the maximum price is used (7% against 4.9% for
the minimum price), the result in either case is the same. The changeover e￿ect
for TL is always strongly signi￿cant and is solidly larger than for other types of
restaurants.
One might wonder whether the di￿erence between TL and other types of
restaurants is statistically signi￿cant. In particular, it is interesting to assess
the di￿erence between the two extreme types: TL and LL. This is illustrated in
the bottom part of table 6. The t-tests shown are for the null that the di￿erence in
di￿erence term is the same for both TL and LL. As the table shows, the changeover
e￿ect is about 4-5% stronger for tourist restaurants and this di￿erence is indeed
statistically signi￿cant.
V Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of the results discussed in the previous
section. Four dimensions of robustness are of potential concern:
￿ robustness to the inclusion of additional restaurant characteristics,
￿ robustness to alternative estimation methods,
￿ robustness to serial correlation,
￿ robustness to alternative de￿nitions for the location variables.
The ￿rst point concerns the extent to which the location dummies may capture the
e￿ect of omitted restaurant characteristics. We accordingly introduce measures of
17restaurant quality and potential capacity constraints in the analysis. The second
and third points concern the estimation method. The robust regression approach
we used in the previous section was motivated by the presence of outliers. Given
the longitudinal nature of our data, serial correlation of residuals may be a fur-
ther problem. We thus consider OLS estimates in which observations have been
clustered by restaurant. The last point is motivated by the fact that the location
variables are based on the interpretation of the guide’s description for the restau-
rant. We therefore try to establish whether our main message would still hold if
we were to use a more objective criterion. Finally, we discuss the possibility that
the introduction of the single currency might have diverted the ￿ows of tourists
across Europe. Were this the case, our results would merely re￿ect a euro-driven
demand shock for tourist restaurants in euro countries. For the remainder of the
paper, we will omit regression outputs and only show results in a synthetic format.
Robustness to additional characteristics
The procedure we adopt consists in choosing an additional characteristic and
adding to the model all the possible interactions between the selected characteris-
tic, the time periods, and the non-euro dummy. The ￿rst characteristic considered
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if advanced booking is necessary to eat
at the restaurant. This can be considered as a proxy for potential capacity con-
straints. Results are shown in the top part of table 7. The ￿rst row shows the
di￿erence in di￿erence terms for restaurants for which booking is not essential.
The third row shows the di￿erence in di￿erence term for restaurants for which
booking is essential. As the table shows, BOOKING ESS. alters the e￿ect of the
changeover. Interestingly, for all types of locations, it magni￿es the e￿ect when
18the minimum price is used, and it reduces it when the maximum price is used. Al-
though this result might appear puzzling, there is a relatively simple explanation
for it. The changeover has reduced the spread (the di￿erence between maximum
and minimum price) for restaurants with capacity constraints and increased it
for other restaurants. Ceteris paribus, a customer consuming a basic meal, i.e.
one for which the minimum price is charged, represents a higher opportunity cost
for a capacity constrained restaurant. This is because the customer is probably
preventing some other customer, who in principle might be willing to spend more,
from eating at the restaurant. On the other hand, if the restaurant has spare
capacity, this opportunity cost is zero. This might explain why, in the presence of
a coordinated increase in prices, restaurants with capacity constraints have sought
to increase more the price of a basic meal whereas restaurants with spare capac-
ity have tried to increase more the price of expensive meals. As for robustness,
table 7 shows that, despite the inclusion of BOOKING ESS., the e￿ect on tourist
restaurants is always higher than the e￿ect on other restaurants independently of
whether booking is required or not. For tourist restaurants, the e￿ect ranges from
5.7% to almost 9%. In comparison, the e￿ect for LL ranges from 2.2% to 5.3%.
The second variable we consider is a proxy of quality: the number of stars
awarded by the guide. In this case, considering the groups of restaurants with
zero, one, two, and three stars as distinct groups is not a viable option. This would
require the introduction of eighteen additional dummy variables in the baseline
model. Therefore, we only separate the largest group, the restaurants with no
stars, from the others. The results, showed in the bottom part of table 7 are very
similar to those obtained with the introduction of BOOKING ESS. This is not
surprising since the two characteristics are correlated. As before, while the vari-
19able has an e￿ect on the impact of the changeover, the impact is still higher for
restaurants in tourist locations. In summary, the inclusion of additional variables
does not diminish the claim that the changeover e￿ect mainly originates from
restaurants in tourist locations.
Robustness to alternative estimation methods and serial
correlation
A potential problem is the presence of serial correlation in our data. We thus ver-
ify that our results still hold if standard errors are clustered by restaurant. Since
the presence of outliers could a￿ect the OLS coe￿cients, we remove extreme ob-
servations. Table 8 shows the results for the OLS with clustered standard errors
when 2, 4, and 6% of observations in the tails of the distribution of the dependent
variable are removed. Comparing table 8 with table 4 suggests that the result
that tourist restaurants are the main source of post-changeover in￿ation is indeed
robust.
Robustness to alternative de￿nitions for the location vari-
ables
The location variables TL, LL, and PL are based on the description of the restau-
rant provided by the guide. Since the guide uses a variety of expressions to describe
a restaurant, the construction of the variables inevitably relies on the interpreta-
tion of these expressions. We want to assess the extent to which our results are
a￿ected by the way the variables are constructed. To implement this, we take a
drastic approach. Among the criteria we used to de￿ne a tourist location, there is
20one that is not susceptible of interpretation: whether the restaurant is within the
premises of a hotel or not. We thus check whether there is a positive changeover
e￿ect for hotel restaurants. Results are presented in table 9. Hotel restaurants
constitute only about 8% of the restaurants in our sample. Despite the limited
availability of observations, table 9 shows a signi￿cant changeover e￿ect for hotel
restaurants. This ranges between 13.7% and 19.2% with robust regression (which
is probably more reliable) and between 26.9% and 33.5% with OLS. 9 By contrast,
the changeover e￿ect for other restaurants ranges between 1% and 4.1% with ro-
bust regression (2.9% and 6.4% when using OLS). These results should however
be taken with caution. The business strategy of an hotel restaurant is, to some
extent, in￿uenced by the strategy of the hotel. We have tried to overcome this
problem by considering only establishments listed as \restaurants" in the guide
and not those listed as \hotels". The formers are more likely to attract also non-
resident customers. Nevertheless, we believe that a more robust assessment of the
euro e￿ect is provided by the location variables used in the previous section. The
aim of this exercise is only to show that our results are not driven by arbitrary
interpretations of the guide’s descriptions.
We also monitor the sensitivity of the results to changes in the de￿nitions of
the location variables. In particular, two criteria deserve attention: whether the
restaurant has a particular view and whether it has a rare specialty. We have con-
sidered restaurants with a particular view as TL and restaurants with a specialty
as LL. These two criteria provide somewhat more ambiguous hints on the type of
location than other criteria used to de￿ne TL and LL in section III. We therefore
repeat the analysis by considering as PL all restaurants that either have a view
9The relatively low number of observations implies that the standard errors are quite high
for hotel restaurants. This may explain why the p-values are relatively high despite the large
changeover e￿ect.
21or have some rare specialty and cannot be classi￿ed as TL or LL under any other
criterion. The results (omitted) show that our main message is not a￿ected by
the use of a more conservative de￿nition for TL and LL. 10
Euro-driven demand shocks
We provide evidence to rule out the alternative explanation for our results {
namely that the introduction of the euro might have diverted tourist ￿ows toward
euro countries. Table 10 reports the percentage changes in nights spent in tourist
accommodation (source: Eurostat). This is a commonly used indicator of tourist
￿ows. The e￿ect of the euro on tourist ￿ows should be re￿ected in the number
of nights spent by non-residents. The table shows no evidence of a jump of non-
residents stays for the euro countries. France and Italy roughly experienced the
same growth of non-residents nights as the UK. Germany even shows a decline
in the number of tourists.11 Overall rates considering both residents and non-
residents do not also di￿er between euro countries and non-euro countries. Hence,
the hypothesis that the single currency spurred tourism in the short-term does
not appear to be a likely explanation for the evidence presented.
VI A model of the catering market
Common explanations for the changeover e￿ect fail to predict the heterogeneous
response to the changeover by restaurants in di￿erent locations documented in
the previous section. Understanding the reasons for this heterogeneity is a neces-
10Results are available upon request.
11We consider the change between nights in 2002 and nights in 2000. This is consistent with
the use of Michelin data for the 2000-2003 period since the guide is published at the beginning
of the year and mostly re￿ects previous year prices.
22sary step towards the development of policy recommendations for countries which
might, in the future, adopt the common currency. This section presents a simple
model of the catering market whose predictions match the observed behaviour of
restaurants. Here, we outline the crucial assumptions and the main predictions.
A formal discussion is contained in the Appendix.
The set of players is formed by customers and (monopolistic) restaurants. The
(exogenously determined) quality of a restaurant can be either high or low. We
treat restaurant meals as ‘experience’ goods (Nelson, 1970; Cooper and Ross,
1984).12 There are two types of customers: informed (locals) and uninformed
(tourists). Locals always know in advance the quality of a given restaurant whereas
tourists only learn it after the meal. However, tourists observe the price charged
by the restaurant and other characteristics such as its location, and coherently
update their beliefs.
We refer to the uninformed customers as ‘tourists’. This should not be taken
literally. The model and its empirical implications would not change if we allowed
a fraction of the actual tourist population to acquire information through tourist
guides or by talking to the locals. What is relevant is that a fraction of the
tourists is typically uninformed, as suggested by casual observation. When we
use the word ‘tourists’, we imply this fraction. By the same token, the data
on quality employed in the empirical analysis, which are taken from a tourist
guide, are assumed to form a richer information set than the one available to the
(uninformed) tourists.
12Chan and Leland (1982) consider the problem of ‘search goods’ (i.e. those goods whose
quality can only be observed after bearing some information cost). Real world goods usually
fall in between these two categories. Despite tourists being able to obtain some information on
the quality of a restaurant, for instance by purchasing a tourist guide, the restaurant example
resembles more the case of an experience good (von Ungern-Sternberg and von Weizsacker,
1985).
23Restaurants and customers are randomly matched. The probability for restau-
rant i to be matched with a tourist (‘location’) varies across restaurants. Prior
to the matching stage, restaurants post a price for the meal (which we assume
to be a take it or leave it o￿er). Hence, restaurants are not able to discriminate
between locals and tourists. A possible interpretation of these assumptions is that
every restaurant is required to display a menu before knowing whether the match
will be with a tourist or with a local and is committed to the prices shown in the
menu.
Restaurants choose between three business models: i) charging a price that
attracts both types of customers, ii) charging a price that attracts only tourists, iii)
charging a price that attracts only locals. Each restaurant chooses its particular
business model according to its location and its quality. Restaurants in tourist
locations pro￿t relatively more from attracting tourists. At the same time, low
quality restaurants can pro￿t, if matched with a tourist, from mimicking high
quality restaurants. Hence, they have a higher incentive to deal with tourists.
Proposition 1 in the Appendix establishes that whenever the production cost of
a high quality meal is low enough, there is a continuum of equilibria. 13 These
equilibria can be characterized as follows: i) restaurants in non-tourist locations
tend to charge the locals’ reservation price thereby extracting all the surplus from
their customers, ii) low quality restaurants in tourist locations charge a price
pT and attract only tourists (who experience negative surplus), iii) high quality
restaurants in tourist locations also charge pT attracting both types of customers
(who obtain positive surplus).
The type of equilibrium selected, and the associated equilibrium price, depend
13We focus on pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. In order to obtain sharp empirical
predictions, we restrict attention to equilibria in which all trade between restaurants and tourists
occurs at the same price, pT.
24on agents’ beliefs about the price that will prevail. A simultaneous and coordi-
nated revision of beliefs about the price at which tourists will trade may thus
trigger a price shift from an equilibrium to another one. However, a change in
the equilibrium would never a￿ect the price of those restaurants which ￿nd it op-
timal to deal only with locals in both the initial and the ￿nal equilibrium. Their
customers would never accept a price higher than their reservation price and the
restaurants have no incentive to lower their price. A change in the equilibrium
may only a￿ect prices set by restaurants whose clientele, in either equilibrium,
comprises a positive fraction of tourists. As proposition 2 shows, if the price pT
prevailing in equilibrium experiences an upward shift, the location determines the
e￿ect on the price of a particular restaurant. In particular, restaurants whose
probability to be matched with a tourist exceeds a given threshold will (weakly)
increase their prices, while restaurants with probability below a certain threshold
will not change their prices. The intuition is that restaurants with a low proba-
bility to attract tourists are more likely to be visited by locals who can exert a
more informed control on the price/quality combination they o￿er. By contrast,
restaurants with a high probability of capturing tourists face fewer locals and are
therefore more willing to take advantage from the change in pT.
How might the changeover have provoked such a change? An example is for-
mally analyzed in the appendix. Here, we informally discuss the main intuitions.
Suppose that the static game described so far were repeated a number of times.
A new generation of tourists enters the economy at the beginning of each period
and leaves at the end of the period. We assume that agents are aware of prevailing
prices in the previous periods and, except for the period in which the changeover
occurs, always play equilibrium strategies. During this interim period, customers
25could commit mistakes due to the change in cash denomination. This is a standard
assumption in models dealing with the in￿ationary e￿ects of the changeover { see
for instance Dziuda and Mastrobuoni (2006) and Lippi and Gaiotti (2004). This
idea is also supported by empirical evidence. Dziuda and Mastrobuoni (2006)
report that, during the changeover, individuals had di￿culties in dealing with
the new currency. In particular, they tended to think in terms of old currencies,
felt that they could bene￿t from double pricing, and had problems in comparing
prices.
Since mistakes are the results of the di￿culties of handling a new currency,
we assume that they a￿ect the behaviour of both tourists and locals in the same
fashion.14 In particular, when matched with a restaurant, customers are likely to
accept o￿ers at prices di￿erent from the one they would have accepted before the
changeover, provided that the di￿erence is relatively small. As the new price moves
away from the previous level, the likelihood that the o￿er is accepted declines.
Since mistakes are relatively more costly for restaurants which usually deal with a
number of customers than for individual agents, we assume that restaurants make
accurate calculations and do not commit mistakes when announcing their prices.
If a restaurant catering only for locals tries to exploit the changeover by in-
creasing its price in the interim period, it will be forced to revert back to the
previous level the following period, since its customers would desert it otherwise.
By contrast, if a restaurant catering for tourists charges a higher price, there is no
reason why it should revert to the pre-changeover price the following period, when
mistakes disappear. This is a result of the indeterminacy of the price at which
14This is a conservative assumption. If prices were more transparent to regular customers {
as it is fair to assume { our predictions would still hold. For instance, Dziuda and Mastrobuoni
(2006) consider a model where the transparency of prices in the new currency is endogenous
and ￿nd that transparency is negatively related to changeover-driven in￿ation.
26tourists trade: there is a continuum of equilibrium values for pT. In the working
paper version, we argue that it is possible to conceive of reasonable o￿-equilibrium
beliefs that force a temporary increase of the price at which tourists trade to be-
come permanent. As a consequence, while customers’ mistakes in￿uence the be-
haviour of restaurants for locals only temporarily, they may permanently alter the
equilibrium behaviour of restaurants catering for tourists or for both tourists and
locals. This happens even though the mistakes themselves are only temporary.
VII Conclusions
The introduction of the euro has had in￿ationary consequences on the service
sector and in particular on the catering market. Restaurant prices have registered
marked increases in the euro zone. The evidence from the Michelin Red Guide
suggests that: i) abnormal price increases in the euro area immediately after the
changeover were not matched by similar increases outside the euro area, ii) most of
the ‘changeover e￿ect’ came from restaurants catering for tourists. The ￿rst result
con￿rms that the abnormal price increases were not driven by a shock common to
all European countries. They were speci￿c to countries in the Euro area. Within
these countries, the marked price increases in restaurants in tourist locations would
seem to indicate that suggested justi￿cations in terms of rounding-o￿ of prices in
the new currency or overdue and delayed adjustment of menus can at best only
be part of the story.
There has been a speculative change in relative prices in Euroland, with redis-
tributional e￿ects in favour of the catering sector.
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Appendix A: The model
There is a large number, formally a continuum, of restaurants in the economy.
Conditional on being matched with a customer, restaurant i has an exogenous
probability ￿i 2 [0;1] to be matched with a tourist, where ￿i has a continuous
distribution F : [0;1] ! [0;1] with full support. For simplicity we refer to ￿i
as \location". In general, ￿i is a measure of the restaurant’s ability to attract
tourists. Restaurant i has a probability 1 ￿ ￿i to be matched with a local. For
a large number of matches, ￿i and 1 ￿ ￿i can be interpreted as the fractions of
tourists and locals in the total clientele. We assume that the restaurant’s location,
￿i, is observable by everyone.
It is worth noting that the introduction of stochastic matching implies that
restaurants do not compete. This assumption appears especially reasonable in
29the catering sector which is usually characterised by spatial dispersion, capacity
constraints, and barriers related to the free entry of new ￿rms in the presence of
equilibrium pro￿ts.
In addition to being di￿erent in the probability to be spotted by tourists,
restaurants also di￿er in their quality. There are high quality, h, and low quality,
l, restaurants. The set of restaurants is given by ￿ = fl;hg ￿ [0;1]. For any
￿i, there is a fraction ￿x of type-x restaurants, where ￿x 2 [0;1], x 2 fl;hg,
￿l + ￿h = 1. Producing meals is costly and the unit cost depends on quality:
c(l) < c(h).
Customers (locals/tourists) have inelastic demand and consume either one
meal or nothing. We assume that customers obtain 0 in the case they do not
accept the o￿er of the restaurant. Both customer-types want to maximise their
surplus:
U(x) = v(x) ￿ p (4)
where p is price and v(x) is the utility associated with a meal of quality x 2 fl;hg.
We assume that c(h) > v(l). Accordingly, under perfect information, no customer
would ever buy from a restaurant of low quality at any price that is also feasible
for a high quality restaurant.
Restaurants’ business models
Locals solve a trivial problem. Whenever v(x) ￿ p they accept the o￿er. Tourists
must compute expectations given the observable characteristics of the restaurant.
Upon observing restaurant i with location ￿i, charging price pi, the expected
payo￿ for a tourist is E(v(xi)jpi;￿i) ￿ pi when accepting the o￿er and 0 when
declining it.
30The notion of equilibrium in this model reduces to a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium in the (signaling) game in which restaurants choose their prices and cus-
tomers decide whether to accept or to decline the o￿ers.
De￿nition 1. A (pure strategy) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a pro￿le of
restaurant prices, a pro￿le of strategies (accept, decline) for customers, and a set
of beliefs for tourists such that: i) restaurants optimally choose their prices on the
basis of their ability to attract tourists (￿i), their quality, and customers’ strate-
gies; ii) tourists’ beliefs, upon observing ￿i and pi, are derived from restaurants’
strategies using Bayes rule where possible; iii) customers’ strategies are optimal
given their beliefs.
For empirical convenience, we restrict attention to Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
in which all trade between restaurants and tourists occurs at a unique price, pT.
Such equilibria can always be sustained by postulating that tourists, upon observ-
ing an o￿-equilibrium price, assume that the quality of the restaurant announcing
that price is relatively low.15
Restaurants must decide among three alternative business models: dealing
with both locals and tourists, dealing only with tourists, and dealing only with
locals. The restaurants associated with the three models are respectively denoted
as Popular Restaurants (PR), Restaurants for Tourists (RT) and Restaurants for
Regulars (RR).
A tourist su￿ers an ex-post loss when he goes to a Restaurant for Tourists. If
he were not, then locals would also go to the RT. But then the restaurant would
no longer be a RT. A RT would then charge pT, where pT > v(xi). Notice also
that for the tourist not to be able to detect the rip-o￿, there must be restaurants
with an equivalent location and quality higher than pT for which it is optimal to
charge pT.
15Other equilibria may be possible if, for example, we allow restaurants with di￿erent locations
to trade with tourists at di￿erent prices. Considering these equilibria would complicate the
analysis withour adding to the intuition.
31A RR charges a price that is di￿erent from pT and is not higher than the utility
associated with its expected quality. These restaurants are able to extract all the
consumers’ surplus since their customers (locals) know their quality, and RR know
they know. Hence, in equilibrium, RR always charge pi = v(xi). Tourists can
actually recognize RR since these restaurants charge prices di￿erent from pT in
equilibrium. However, zero surplus implies that it is (weakly) optimal for tourists
to reject the o￿ers of RR.
Finally, a PR charges pT ￿ v(xi). In this way, it will attract both types of
customers. Note that customers obtain non-negative surplus when matched with
a popular restaurant.
Pro￿ts associated with each business model are:
￿PR = p
T ￿ c(xi); p







T > v(xi) (6)
￿RR = (1 ￿ ￿i)(v(xi) ￿ c(xi)); v(xi) 6= p
T (7)
The incentive to deal with tourists depends on the price pT prevailing in the
market and on the ability to attract them, ￿i. Restaurants with a high ￿i will
always choose to deal with tourists provided that pT be high enough. If pT is higher
than the utility associated with their quality they will become RT. Otherwise, they
will opt for becoming PR. Symmetrically, the incentive to deal only with locals is
stronger for restaurants with a low ￿i.
32Equilibrium analysis
The set of equilibria we analyse is characterised by a distribution of prices such
that PR and RT announce pi = pT, while RR announce pi = v(xi).
First note that there always exists an equilibrium, characterised by pT = v(l),
in which only low quality restaurants deal with tourists (PR) and high quality
restaurants only cater for locals (RR). This is a typical situation ￿ a la Akerlof
where higher qualities are driven out of the tourist segment of the market.
Equilibria other than the one characterised by pT = v(l) require that pT > c(h).
If pT were lower than or equal to c(h), no high quality restaurant would charge
pT and tourists would make a certain loss when trading at pT. Given pT > c(h),
low quality restaurants decide whether to charge v(l) and be RR or charge pT
and be RT. High quality restaurants choose between charging v(h) and being RR,
and charging pT and being PR. The following result establishes conditions for the
existence of equilibria other than the one characterised by pT = v(l).
Proposition 1. If
￿hv(h) + ￿lv(l)
￿h + ￿l > c(h) (8)






Note that c(h) is the minimum price that a restaurant of quality h can charge
without incurring a loss. The expression on the left hand side of inequality (8)
is the expected utility from trading at pT given the tourist’s posterior beliefs.
In these equilibria, tourists experience a positive surplus when matched with a
high quality restaurant and a negative surplus when matched with low quality
restaurants.16
16Even though the equilibria we analyse are characterised by a certain degree of pooling of
33If restaurants believe that tourists will trade at a particular value of pT, they
will charge that value. This implies that if beliefs are revised, the economy could
shift to an equilibrium with di￿erent prices. The following proposition suggests
that there is a testable relationship between the price change of a restaurant and
its location:
Proposition 2. Assume that a revision of beliefs selects an equilibrium charac-
terised by a higher tourist price pT. Then, there exist ￿￿ and ~ ￿ < ￿￿ such that:
i) every restaurant, i, with ￿i ￿ ￿￿, charges a price greater than or equal to its
initial price; ii) every restaurant ￿i < ~ ￿ leaves its price unchanged.
As explained in the proof, restaurants in less \extreme" locations (i.e. ￿i 2
[~ ￿;￿￿)) raise or lower their prices according to their quality.
Changeover, mistakes, and shifts in equilibrium prices: an
example
After having analysed the e￿ect of a change in the equilibrium, we turn to the
issue of how the changeover might have provoked such a change. A possible ex-
ample (tough not the only one) is the following. Suppose that the static game
we described so far was repeated a ￿nite number of times. In each period, a new
generation of tourists enter the economy and leave at the end of the period. We
assume that in all periods all agents play equilibrium strategies, except for pe-
riod t in which the changeover occurs. In the interim period t, we allow for the
possibility that customers commit mistakes due to the change in cash denomina-
tion. Mistakes are the results of the di￿culties of handling a new currency and,
therefore, a￿ect the behaviour of tourists as well as locals. However, we shall
di￿erent types of restaurants, the beliefs supporting these equilibria are robust to the Intuitive
Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Low quality restaurants could always bene￿t from deviating
to a higher price if tourists, upon observing the deviation from the equilibrium, were to believe
that the restaurants deviating were, for instance, high quality restaurants. Therefore, beliefs
assigning a low quality upon observing a deviation from the equilibrium are robust.
34argue below, while customers’ mistakes in￿uence the behaviour of restaurants for
locals only temporarily, they may permanently alter the equilibrium behaviour
of restaurants catering for tourists or for both. We consider the following sort
of mistakes. A customer (tourist/local) who, if present in period t ￿ 1, would
have been willing to accept the o￿er of restaurant i charging t￿1pi, accepts the
o￿er at any price tpi = t￿1pi + ￿ with probability m(￿) 2 [0;1] if matched
with restaurant i in period t. m(:) is assumed to be continuous and di￿erentiable.
The function has a global maximum at ￿ = 0, with m0(￿) ￿ 0 for ￿ < 0 and
m0(￿) ￿ 0 for any ￿ > 0.17 We also assume that m(￿) goes to zero fairly quickly
as j￿j increases. The intuition is that customers are more likely to accept the
o￿ers at prices that are relatively closer to the pre-changeover equilibrium price
for restaurant i: t￿1pi. As the new price moves away from t￿1pi, the likelihood
that the o￿er is accepted never increases. Although for simplicity we have not
explicitly introduced competition among restaurants into the model, the proba-
bility m(￿) may be interpreted as a reduced form that should capture the e￿ect
of competitive pressures. Finally, we assume that types of customers who would
not have accepted the o￿er at t￿1pi, keep doing so and reject any o￿er in the
neighborhood of t￿1pi.
Since mistakes are relatively more costly for restaurants which usually deal
with a number of customers, we assume that restaurants make accurate calcu-
lations and do not commit mistakes when announcing their prices. Given the
customers’ behaviour, restaurant i in period t solves:
max
￿
m(￿)[ t￿1pi + ￿ ￿ c(xi)] (9)
17Results would not change if we assumed that the probability m(￿) decrease only when
the price increases (￿ > 0) and remain constant when the price decreases or remains constant
(￿ ￿ 0).
35From the ￿rst order condition, the optimal ￿ for restaurant i (￿i) solves t￿1pi +
￿i = c(xi)￿
m(￿i)
m0(￿i). This, given t￿1pi+￿i ￿ c(xi), implies ￿i > 0. Note also that
￿i depends on restaurant i’s quality, xi, so that type h restaurants experience
di￿erent price increases from type l.
Since ￿i > 0 for all restaurants, all restaurants will raise their prices in period
t. However, an essential di￿erence between restaurants catering only for locals
and all other restaurants arises in period t + 1 when mistakes disappear and
equilibrium play is resumed. If restaurant i only caters for locals, it is forced to
revert to t+1pi = t￿1pi = v(xi) (provided it keeps catering only for locals in
period t+1), since the locals would desert it otherwise. By converse, restaurants
which cater only for tourists or for both announce t￿1pi = pT in period t￿1, and
tpi = pT +￿i in period t. However, there is no reason why the price should revert
to pT in period t + 1. In fact, a di￿erent equilibrium price ~ pT may arise. What
price will be selected depends on how tourists’ beliefs out of the equilibrium path
are a￿ected by the changeover.
We now illustrate how changes in o￿-equilibrium beliefs may lead to a perma-
nent increase in the equilibrium price ~ pT. Suppose that, at t+1, tourists trade at
the new equilibrium price ~ pT. Upon observing an o￿-equilibrium price p at t + 1,
tourists hold the following beliefs. If p is identical to some price posted at time t,
they conjecture that the quality associated with p re￿ects the quality that used
to be sold at p at t. In other words, tourists would assume that the restaurant
has just \forgotten" to charge the new equilibrium price. Let pT + ￿, ￿ > 0, be
the price charged at time t by the high quality restaurants that were dealing with
tourists. Our o￿-equilibrium beliefs imply that if tourists observe pT + ￿ at time
t + 1, they conjecture that the restaurant is of type h. Hence, provided that ￿ is
36not too large, they will accept to consume at the restaurant. As a result, ~ pT must
exceed pT + ￿. Otherwise, no type of restaurant (h or l) would ever charge ~ pT,
since they can charge pT + ￿. The changeover has thus provoked a positive shift
in the equilibrium price at which tourists trade.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Tourists will accept the o￿er of a restaurant charging pT if E(v(xi)jpT;￿i) ￿
pT. We ￿rst establish that if pT is in the interval described in Proposition 1, there
is a positive fraction of restaurants of type l and h which charge pT. Then, we
prove that it is optimal to trade at pT for tourists. From equations (5) and (7),
high quality restaurants will choose to charge pT and behave as PR (rather than




By construction, ￿(h) < 1 whenever pT > c(h). Hence, at any price above c(h)
there are type h restaurants for which charging pT is optimal given tourists’ o￿-
equilibrium beliefs. From equations (6) and (7), type l restaurants prefer to be
RT (rather than RR) if their ￿i is above:
￿(l) ￿
v(l) ￿ c(l)
pT + v(l) ￿ 2c(l)







, since c(h) > v(l). Hence, there are always restaurants
of type l willing to charge pT. As for tourists, note that, whenever ￿(h) > ￿(l),
type l restaurants with ￿(l) ￿ ￿i < ￿(h) could not pro￿t from charging pT as long
as tourist are able to observe their location. The reason is that it is suboptimal to
37charge pT for all high quality restaurants with ￿i < ￿(h). Hence, if ￿(h) > ￿i ￿
￿(l), the tourist would assume, upon observing a restaurant ￿i charging pT, that
he is facing a low quality restaurant. If so, knowing that a tourist would never
accept their o￿ers, these restaurants will instead charge v(l) and deal with locals
only. Hence, ￿i ￿ ￿(l) is necessary but not su￿cient for a low quality restaurant
to charge pT. Symmetrically, if ￿(l) > ￿i ￿ ￿(h), the tourist would correctly
detect a high quality restaurant and would always accept the o￿er. Thus, the
tourist is actually uncertain about the quality only when ￿i ￿ max[￿(h);￿(l)].







are always restaurants whose quality cannot be assessed with certainty. In these
cases, the posterior belief of the tourist is that the restaurant is low quality with
probability ￿l=(￿h+￿l) and high quality with probability ￿h=(￿h+￿l). Therefore,





which is the maximum price the tourist is willing to pay and, therefore, the upper
bound for pT. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
As in Proposition 1, low quality restaurants decide whether to be RR or RT.
Let ￿(l) denote the threshold value of ￿i that determines the choice of the business
model for type l restaurants. ￿(l) follows from (6) and (7):
￿(l) ￿
v(l) ￿ c(l)
pT + v(l) ￿ 2c(l)
38From equations (5) and (7), high quality restaurants ￿nd it optimal to charge pT




We have already noted that, for a type l restaurant, the condition ￿i ￿ ￿(l)
is only necessary for charging pT. ￿i ￿ ￿(h) should also hold, otherwise the
tourists would be able to assess that these restaurants are not high quality by
observing their location. We denote with a \￿" the values of variables in the
initial equilibrium and with a \ ~ " the values in the ￿nal equilibrium. Since ￿(l)
and ￿(h) are decreasing in pT, for ~ pT > p￿T, the relationships ~ ￿(l) < ￿￿(l) and
~ ￿(h) < ￿￿(h) must hold. Consider now all restaurants such that ￿i ￿ ￿￿(h).
All high quality restaurants with ￿i ￿ ￿￿(h) were charging p￿T in the initial
equilibrium and therefore charge ~ pT in the ￿nal equilibrium. Thus, they have
raised their price. Within low quality restaurants with ￿i ￿ ￿￿(h), a positive
fraction (1￿F(max[￿￿(l);￿￿(h)])) were charging p￿T, and a (possibly zero) fraction
(max[F(￿￿(l))￿F(￿￿(h));0]) were charging v(l) in the initial equilibrium. In the
￿nal equilibrium, all the restaurants in the ￿rst group and, provided ￿￿(l) > ￿￿(h),
a fraction F(￿￿(l))￿F(max[~ ￿(l);￿￿(h)]) of restaurants in the second group switch
to ~ pT, thus increasing their prices. The rest keeps charging v(l). Thus, they have
either raised their price or left it unchanged. But then, de￿ning ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿(h)
proves point i). Consider now restaurants with ￿i < ~ ￿(h). Since ~ ￿(h) < ￿￿(h)
high quality restaurants were charging v(h) in the initial equilibrium and keep
doing so in the ￿nal equilibrium. At the same time, low quality restaurants
were also charging v(l) in the initial equilibrium and, because of their location,
cannot credibly pretend to be high quality by announcing ~ pT. Thus, they keep
announcing v(l). Therefore, de￿ning ~ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿(h) proves point ii). Finally, we give
39account of the the behaviour of restaurants in the interval [ ~ ￿;￿￿). In this case, the
price change is conditional on the restaurant’s quality. High quality restaurants
were initially charging v(h) and now charge ~ pT thus reducing their price. Low
quality restaurants were also charging the locals’ reservation price in the initial
equilibrium. In the ￿nal equilibrium, they either charge ~ pT (which is higher) or
stick to the locals’ reservation price. 2
40TABLE 1: Relative frequencies of restaurants’ characteristics
All Sample Euro Non-Euro
Obs. per period 661 496 165
TL 32% 33% 27%
LL 44% 46% 39%
PL 24% 21% 34%
HOTEL 8% 8% 7%
(Hotel Restaurant)
BOOKING ESS. 25% 27% 22%
NO STARS 72% 67% 85%
ONE STAR 17% 20% 12%
TWO STARS 8% 10% 2%
THREE STARS 3% 3% 1%
UPGRADE
2000-2001 1.8% 1.8% 1.8 %
2001-2002 1.5% 1.8% 0.6%
2002-2003 1.2% 1.4% 0.6%
DOWNGRADE
2000-2001 0.6% 0.8% 0.0%
2001-2002 2.1% 2.4% 1.2%
2002-2003 1.4% 1.8% 0.0%
Notes: TL is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the restaurant is in a tourist location. LL is a
dummy variable taking value 1 if the restaurant is in a location for local costumers. PL is a
dummy variable taking value 1 if the restaurant is neither in a tourist location nor in a local
costumers’ location. HOTEL is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the restaurant is within the
premises of an hotel. BOOKING ESSENTIAL is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the guide
recommends advance booking. The number of stars awarded to a restaurant is an indicator of
the quality of its cuisine. UPGRADE (DOWNGRADE) is a dummy variable taking value 1 if
the number of stars granted to the restaurant by the guide has increased (decreased) in the
period considered. The Euro subsample includes restaurants in France, Germany, and Italy.





Euro TL LL PL N-Euro TL LL PL
mean 0.047 0.045 0.052 0.056 0.012 0.052 0.040 0.036 0.080
00-01 med. 0.030 0.023 0.042 0.039 0.000 0.041 0.037 0.061 0.040
SD 0.175 0.130 0.127 0.136 0.115 0.268 0.204 0.277 0.303
mean 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.056 0.063 0.059 0.047 0.046 0.084
01-02 med. 0.043 0.044 0.058 0.046 0.038 0.037 0.000 0.040 0.061
SD 0.155 0.135 0.123 0.132 0.159 0.204 0.232 0.195 0.192
mean 0.031 0.042 0.083 0.027 0.014 -0.002 0.023 0.003 -0.029
02-03 med. 0.036 0.046 0.068 0.021 0.024 0.017 0.010 -0.007 0.040





Euro TL LL PL N-Euro TL LL PL
mean 0.041 0.036 0.027 0.047 0.026 0.057 0.077 0.036 0.065
00-01 med. 0.031 0.022 0.030 0.034 0.000 0.040 0.072 0.045 0.033
SD 0.187 0.176 0.235 0.143 0.127 0.215 0.153 0.196 0.273
mean 0.049 0.051 0.070 0.047 0.032 0.040 0.045 0.053 0.022
01-02 med. 0.036 0.038 0.047 0.042 0.007 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.019
SD 0.176 0.179 0.233 0.132 0.166 0.168 0.158 0.166 0.179
mean 0.035 0.050 0.078 0.038 0.034 -0.009 0.017 -0.041 0.008
02-03 med. 0.029 0.037 0.068 0.020 0.021 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000
SD 0.160 0.148 0.133 0.133 0.149 0.186 0.188 0.164 0.205
Notes: ￿P min is the log-change of the minimum price relative to the previous year edition for
the period considered. ￿P max is the log-change of the maximum price relative to the previous
year edition.
42TABLE 3: Robust estimates of restaurant in￿ation
Dependent Variable
Period ￿ Location ￿ Non Euro ￿P min ￿P max
Dummy Dummy Dummy Coe￿. S.E. Coe￿. S. E.
/ / NO 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.011
2000-2001 TL NO 0.031* 0.015 0.031* 0.015
2000-2001 LL NO 0.029* 0.014 0.027* 0.014
2001-2002 / NO 0.027 0.016 -0.003 0.016
2001-2002 TL NO 0.013 0.015 0.039** 0.015
2001-2002 LL NO 0.012 0.014 0.035* 0.014
2002-2003 / NO 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.016
2002-2003 TL NO 0.051*** 0.015 0.044** 0.015
2002-2003 LL NO 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.014
/ / YES 0.010 0.019 0.024 0.019
2000-2001 TL YES -0.011 0.028 0.004 0.027
2000-2001 LL YES -0.003 0.025 -0.019 0.025
2001-2002 / YES 0.009 0.027 -0.006 0.027
2001-2002 TL YES -0.079** 0.028 -0.016 0.027
2001-2002 LL YES -0.024 0.025 -0.032 0.025
2002-2003 / YES 0.021 0.027 -0.037 0.027
2002-2003 TL YES -0.094*** 0.028 -0.039 0.027
2002-2003 LL YES -0.061* 0.025 -0.018 0.025
Other Control Variables
UPGRADE 0.052* 0.022 0.029 0.022
DOWNGRADE 0.021 0.023 -0.022 0.023
Obs 1983 1983
% weight=0 2.1% 1.8%
F-Test 3.30*** 2.60***
Notes: The table presents robust regression results. The dependent variable is the log-change
in minimum (maximum) price relative to the previous year edition. The ￿rst eighteen
explanatory variables are given by the interactions between time periods (2000-2001,
2001-2002, 2002-2003), locations (TL, LL, PL), and Euro/Non Euro areas. UPGRADE
(DOWNGRADE) is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the number of stars granted to the
restaurant by the guide has increased (decreased) in the period considered. The model is:
￿P = ￿0 + ￿9DNE + (￿1 + ￿10DNE)D00￿01 ￿ TL + (￿2 + ￿11DNE)D00￿01 ￿ LL +
+(￿3 + ￿12DNE)D01￿02 + (￿4 + ￿13DNE)D01￿02 ￿ TL + (￿5 + ￿14DNE)D01￿02 ￿ LL +
+(￿6 + ￿15DNE)D02￿03 + (￿7 + ￿16DNE)D02￿03 ￿ TL + (￿8 + ￿17DNE)D02￿03 ￿ LL +
+￿18UPGRADE + ￿19DOWNGRADE
DNE is the non euro dummy. D(t￿1)￿t are period dummies. *=5% signi￿cant ** = 1%
signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant. 43TABLE 4: Di￿erences in in￿ation between euro and non-euro countries before
and after the changeover
Unrestricted ￿P min ￿P max
Model
Location TL LL PL TL LL PL
di￿ before (a) 0.000 -0.008 -0.010 -0.028 -0.005 -0.024
di￿ after (b) 0.062 0.029 -0.032 0.053 0.031 0.014
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.062 0.037 -0.021 0.081 0.036 0.037
t-test
(b)-(a) =0 2.218* 1.575 -0.781 2.909** 1.559 1.371
p-value 0.027 0.115 0.436 0.004 0.119 0.170
Restricted ￿P min ￿P max
Model I
di￿ before (a) -0.003 -0.015
di￿ after (b) 0.019 0.032




Notes: The unrestricted model is the model estimated in table 3. Di￿ before is the price
change for euro restaurants minus the price change for non-euro restaurants in period
2000-2001. Di￿ after is the price change for euro restaurants minus the price change for
non-euro restaurants in period 2002-2003. For TL, di￿ before is ￿(￿9 + ￿10), di￿ after is
￿(￿9 + ￿15 + ￿16). For LL, di￿ before is ￿(￿9 + ￿11), di￿ after is ￿(￿9 + ￿15 + ￿17). For PL,
di￿ before is ￿￿9, di￿ after is -(￿9 + ￿15). See table 3 for the coe￿cients.
The restricted model (regression output omitted) is:
￿P = ￿0 + ￿3DNE + (￿1 + ￿4DNE)D01￿02 + (￿2 + ￿5DNE)D02￿03 +
+￿6UPGRADE + ￿7DOWNGRADE
See table 3 for the description of the variables. Di￿ before is ￿￿3. Di￿ after is ￿(￿3 + ￿5).
*=5% signi￿cant ** = 1% signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant.
44TABLE 5: Robust estimates of restaurant in￿ation (restricted model II)
Dependent Variable
Period ￿ Location ￿ Euro ￿P min ￿P max
Dummy Dummy Dummy Coe￿. S.E. Coe￿. S. E.
/ / NO 0.042*** 0.009 0.051*** 0.009
2001-2002 / NO -0.002 0.013 -0.015 0.013
2002-2003 / NO -0.020 0.013 0.040** 0.013
/ / YES -0.027 0.015 -0.037* 0.014
2000-2001 TL YES 0.031* 0.015 0.030* 0.014
2000-2001 LL YES 0.030* 0.014 0.027* 0.014
2001-2002 / YES 0.029 0.021 0.012 0.020
2001-2002 TL YES 0.013 0.015 0.039** 0.015
2001-2002 LL YES 0.012 0.014 0.035** 0.014
2002-2003 / YES 0.029 0.021 0.056** 0.020
2002-2003 TL YES 0.051*** 0.015 0.044** 0.014
2002-2003 LL YES 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.014
Other Control Variables
UPGRADE 0.050* 0.022 0.029 0.021
DOWNGRADE 0.022 0.023 -0.022 0.023
Obs 1983 1983
% weight=0 2.0% 1.9%
F-Test 3.32*** 3.49***
Notes: The table presents estimates of a restricted model in which di￿erent locations (TL, LL,
PL) have di￿erent coe￿cients only if the restaurant is in the euro area. The dependent
variable is log-change in minimum (maximum) price relative to the previous year edition. The
model estimated is:
￿P = ￿0 + ￿1D01￿02 + ￿2D02￿03 + ￿3DE + ￿4D00￿01 ￿ TL ￿ DE + ￿5D00￿01 ￿ LL ￿ DE +
+￿6D01￿02 ￿ DE + +￿7D01￿02 ￿ TL ￿ DE + ￿8D01￿02 ￿ LL ￿ DE + ￿9D02￿03 ￿ DE +
+￿10D02￿03 ￿ TL ￿ DE + ￿11D02￿03 ￿ LL ￿ DE + ￿12UPGRADE + ￿13DOWNGRADE
where DE is the euro dummy. *=5% signi￿cant ** = 1% signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant.
45TABLE 6: Di￿erences in in￿ation between euro and non-euro countries before
and after the changeover (restricted model II)
Restricted ￿P min ￿P max
Model II
Location TL LL PL TL LL PL
di￿ before (a) 0.004 0.003 -0.027 -0.006 -0.010 -0.037
di￿ after (b) 0.053 0.003 0.002 0.063 0.019 0.019
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.049 0.000 0.029 0.070 0.029 0.056
t-test
(b)-(a) =0 2.700** 0.020 1.390 3.86*** 1.73 2.75**
p-value 0.007 0.982 0.164 0.000 0.084 0.006
Comparison between TL and LL
di￿TL￿di￿LL ￿P min ￿P max
before (c) 0.001 0.003





Notes: Restricted model II is the model estimated in table 5. Di￿ before is the price change
for euro restaurants minus the price change for non-euro restaurants in period 2000-2001. Di￿
after is the price change for euro restaurants minus the price change for non-euro restaurants
in period 2002-2003. For TL, di￿ before is ￿3 + ￿4, di￿ after is ￿3 + ￿9 + ￿10. For LL, di￿
before is ￿3 + ￿5, di￿ after is ￿3 + ￿9 + ￿11. For PL, di￿ before is ￿3, di￿ after is ￿3 + ￿9. See
table 5 for the coe￿cients.
The bottom part of the table compares the in￿ation di￿erential (euro minus non-euro) for TL
with that of LL. The ￿rst term (c) is ￿4 ￿￿5. The second term (d) is ￿10 ￿￿11. The third term,
(d)-(c), is ￿10 ￿ ￿11 ￿ (￿4 ￿ ￿5). *=5% signi￿cant ** = 1% signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant.
46TABLE 7: Di￿erences in in￿ation between euro and non-euro countries before
and after the changeover: robustness to additional restaurants’ characteristics
Booking ￿P min ￿P max
Essential
Location TL LL PL TL LL PL
NO di￿ in di￿ 0.057 0.031 -0.027 0.089 0.042 0.040
t-test 1.920 1.250 -0.970 3.010** 1.700 1.430
YES di￿ in di￿ 0.079 0.053 -0.005 0.069 0.022 0.020
t-test 2.110* 1.510 -0.130 1.840 0.630 0.520
Number of ￿P min ￿P max
stars￿ 1
NO di￿ in di￿ 0.048 0.022 -0.027 0.087 0.048 0.043
t-test 1.650 0.920 -1.000 3.020** 1.980* 1.590
YES di￿ in di￿ 0.091 0.066 0.016 0.032 -0.007 -0.011
t-test 2.180* 1.670 0.370 0.770 -0.180 -0.260
Notes: The results reported in the table refer to robust regressions in which additional
characteristics and their interactions with time periods and currency areas have been
alternatively added to the base model (see table 3). The additional characteristics considered
are whether booking is essential and whether the restaurant has been awarded 1 or more stars.
Di￿ in di￿ is the di￿erence between euro restaurants and non-euro restaurants in the period
2002-03 minus the di￿erence between euro restaurants and non-euro restaurants in the period
2000-01. *=5% signi￿cant ** = 1% signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant.
47TABLE 8: Di￿erences in in￿ation: OLS with x% of observations in tails removed
and S.E. clustered by restaurant.
2% of obs. ￿P min ￿P max
removed
Location TL LL PL TL LL PL
di￿ before (a) -0.010 0.012 0.001 -0.046 0.004 -0.004
di￿ after (b) 0.042 0.009 -0.006 0.083 0.066 -0.001
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.052 -0.003 -0.008 0.128 0.061 0.003
t-test
(b)-(a) =0 1.61 -0.08 -0.21 3.16** 1.820 0.090
p-value 0.107 0.937 0.830 0.002 0.069 0.932
4% of obs. ￿P min ￿P max
removed
Location TL LL PL TL LL PL
di￿ before (a) -0.013 -0.009 -0.013 -0.033 0.014 -0.014
di￿ after (b) 0.058 0.013 -0.028 0.069 0.060 -0.003
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.070 0.022 -0.015 0.102 0.047 0.011
t-test
(b)-(a) =0 2.35* 0.73 -0.51 2.66** 1.62 0.32
p-value 0.019 0.468 0.611 0.008 0.107 0.751
6% of obs. ￿P min ￿P max
removed
di￿ before (a) -0.010 -0.002 -0.013 -0.022 -0.001 0.003
di￿ after (b) 0.052 0.020 -0.034 0.075 0.062 -0.004
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.062 0.022 -0.022 0.098 0.063 -0.007
t-test
(b)-(a)=0 2.11* 0.84 -0.85 2.72** 2.20* -0.200
p-value 0.035 0.403 0.395 0.007 0.028 0.841
Notes: The model estimated is identical to the model presented in table 3 (regression output is
omitted). Di￿ before is the price change for euro restaurants minus the price change for
non-euro restaurants in period 2000-2001. Di￿ after is the price change for euro restaurants
minus the price change for non-euro restaurants in period 2002-2003. For TL, di￿ before is
￿(￿9 + ￿10), di￿ after is ￿(￿9 + ￿15 + ￿16). For LL, di￿ before is ￿(￿9 + ￿11), di￿ after is
￿(￿9 + ￿15 + ￿17). For PL, di￿ before is ￿￿9, di￿ after is -(￿9 + ￿15). See table 3 for the
coe￿cients. *=5% signi￿cant ** = 1% signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant.
48TABLE 9: Di￿erences in in￿ation between euro and non-euro countries before
and after the changeover: hotel restaurants vs other restaurants
Robust ￿P min ￿P max
Regression
Hotel Restaurant YES NO YES NO
di￿ before (a) -0.098 0.003 -0.065 -0.012
di￿ after (b) 0.094 0.012 0.071 0.029
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.192 0.009 0.137 0.041
t-test
(b)-(a) =0 3.52*** 0.61 2.51* 2.65**
p-value 0.000 0.542 0.012 0.008
OLS with ￿P min ￿P max
Clustered S.E.
Hotel Restaurant YES NO YES NO
di￿ before (a) -0.111 0.001 -0.166 -0.009
di￿ after (b) 0.224 0.030 0.103 0.055
di￿ in di￿ (b)-(a) 0.335 0.029 0.269 0.064
t-test
(b)-(a)=0 2.19* 0.99 2.16* 2.46*
p-value 0.029 0.321 0.031 0.014
Notes: The model estimated is:
￿P = ￿0 + ￿1DNE + (￿2HOTEL + ￿3HOTEL ￿ DNE)D00￿01 +
+(￿4 + ￿5DNE + ￿6HOTEL + ￿7HOTEL ￿ DNE)D01￿02 +
+(￿8 + ￿9DNE + ￿10HOTEL + ￿11HOTEL ￿ DNE)D02￿03 +
+￿12UPGRADE + ￿13DOWNGRADE
where HOTEL is equal to one (zero) if the restaurant is (is not) a hotel restaurant. Di￿
before is the price change for euro restaurants minus the price change for non-euro restaurants
in period 2000-2001. Di￿ after is the price change for euro restaurants minus the price change
for non-euro restaurants in period 2002-2003. When HOTEL = 1, di￿ before is ￿(￿1 + ￿3),
di￿ after is ￿(￿1 + ￿11 + ￿9). When HOTEL = 0, di￿ before is ￿￿1, di￿ after is ￿(￿1 + ￿9).
*=5% signi￿cant ** = 1% signi￿cant. *** = 0.1% signi￿cant.
49TABLE 10: Percentage change in nights spent in tourist accommodations 2002-
2000
Country Residents Non residents Overall
Denmark 0.069 -0.043 0.020
Sweden 0.063 0.129 0.078
UK -0.049 0.051 -0.023
Italy 0.013 0.041 0.024
France 0.008 0.062 0.017
Germany -0.019 -0.048 -0.023
Notes: The table reports the percentage changes in nights spent in tourist accommodations by
residents and non-residents for the countries included in the estimates (Source: Eurostat).
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52Fig.3 Cumulative Functions: Difference in Difference 
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